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Abstract  
Several indicators point to a crisis at the heart of the emerging area of international 
cyber security law. First, proposals of internationally binding treaties by the leading 
stakeholders, including China and Russia, have been met with little enthusiasm by 
other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, 
states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of 
controversial legal questions and thus to express their cyber opinio juris. Third, instead 
of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the more 
ambiguous term ‘norms’. This article argues that the reluctance of states to engage 
themselves in international law-making has generated a power vacuum, lending 
credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed 
by the rapid technological development. In response, several non-state-driven norm-
making initiatives have sought to fill the void, including Microsoft’s cyber norms 
proposals and the Tallinn Manual project. The article then contends that this emerging 
body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to 
reclaim a central law-making position, similarly to historical precedents including the 
development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed 
crisis will lead to the demise of inter-state cyberspace governance or to a recalibration 
of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a 
central role if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in 
a way that would upset their ability to achieve their strategic and political goals. 
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‘A small group of thoughtful committed 
people can change the world. Indeed, it is 
the only thing that ever has.’  
Margaret Mead1 
 
‘States are, at this moment of history, still 
at the heart of the international legal 
system.’  
Rosalyn Higgins2 
 
'[C]ompliance with international law frees 
us to do more, and do more legitimately, in 
cyberspace[.]’ 
Harold H. Koh3 
 
1. Introduction 
The international community faces today a wide gamut of diverse global challenges 
ranging from climate change to international terrorism to cyber threats. What these 
challenges have in common is that they cannot be adequately addressed by any single 
international actor, irrespective of how powerful that actor may be. Instead, all such 
contemporary phenomena necessitate a framework for effective international co-
operation. It is international law that ‘affords [such] a framework, a pattern, a fabric 
for international society’.4 
Although the law establishes a framework of constraints, the flipside of the same 
coin is that it simultaneously guarantees a sphere of autonomy for its subjects.5 In the 
                                                          
1 M. Mead, The World Ahead: An Anthropologist Anticipates the Future (2005), 12. 
2 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1995), 39.  
3 H. H. Koh, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’, (2012) 54 Harvard International Law Journal Online 1, at 
10. 
4 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (1978), 5. 
5 Cf. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986), 155 (‘Autonomy is possible only within a framework of 
constraints.’). 
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context of international law, legal norms lay down shared boundaries of acceptable 
conduct in international relations, while preserving important space for manoeuvre, 
discretion and negotiation. This is the idea at the root of the famous ‘Lotus 
presumption’,6 according to which states may generally act freely unless prevented by 
a contrary rule of international law.7 
In order to delineate this zone of freedom for states and other international actors 
with respect to any internationally significant phenomenon, it is necessary to identify, 
interpret and apply relevant legal rules to it.8 Despite the ongoing debates about the 
supposed decline of the sovereign state,9 it remains the case that states have 
maintained their centrality in the formation, interpretation, and application of 
international legal rules in general.10 But have they kept an equally firm hold on the 
development of international cyber security law?11 
There is little doubt that cyberspace, broadly understood, is a phenomenon of 
international significance in the sense just described. Crucially, the uses and abuses of 
this complex borderless virtual space impinge on vital state interests in the physical 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006), 41–42 (describing the 
presumption as a ‘part of the hidden grammar of international legal language’); but see, e.g., Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion 
of 22 July 2010, [2010] ICJ Rep. 403, Declaration of Judge Simma, at 478, para. 2 (arguing that the 
presumption ‘reflects an old, tired view of international law’).  
7 SS Lotus case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Rep. Series A No. 10, at 18. 
8 Cf. G. M. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (1993), 1 (arguing that in order for the 
international legal system to remain effective, it needs to engage in (1) law-making in novel, so far 
ungoverned areas and (2) constant upgrading and refinement of the existing law). 
9 See, e.g., J. A. Camilleri and J. Falk, The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting 
World (1992); N. Walker, Sovereignty in Transition (2003); J. Bartelson ‘The Concept of Sovereignty 
Revisited’, (2006) 17 EJIL 463; T. Jacobsen, C. Sampford, and R. Thakur (eds.) Re-envisioning Sovereignty: 
The End of Westphalia? (2008); T. Endicott, ‘The Logic of Freedom and Power’ and J. L. Cohen, 
‘Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’, in S. Besson and J. 
Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010).  
10 See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 2, at 39; M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (1999), 13; H. 
Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (2014), 16–19. It is acknowledged that, in addition to state 
consent, modern international law may at least to some extent also be the product of abstract moral 
values such as ‘humanity’, ‘fairness’, or ‘communitarian values’. However, it would be beyond the 
scope of this article to revisit the longstanding debate about the relative contribution of state consent 
and abstract values to the process of formation of international law. For more on this topic, see, e.g., H. 
Charlesworth, ‘Law-making and Sources’, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law (2012), 187 at 187–202 and works cited therein. 
11 The term ‘international cyber security law’, as understood in this article, refers to an emerging legal 
discipline and a body of law that concerns the rights and obligations of states regarding cyber security. 
For an early attempt to define this term in more detail, see W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘The Tallinn 
Manual and International Cyber Security Law’, (2012) 15 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3, at 
13. 
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world, including national security, public safety, and economic development. As such, 
cyberspace extends far beyond the domain of internal affairs of any state.12 It therefore 
follows that it is imperative to clarify the boundary between constraints and autonomy 
as it applies to actors in cyberspace. 
Yet, with respect to the management of cyberspace, it may appear that international 
law presently fails to deliver. Even though the main building blocks of the Internet’s 
architecture had been laid over two decades ago,13 it took until 2013 for state 
representatives to agree on the rudimentary threshold assumption that international 
law actually applies to cyberspace.14 The agreement was touted at the time as a 
‘landmark consensus’,15 but its actual import is controversial.  
To begin with, it was expressed in the form of a non-binding report of a Group of 
Government Experts (GGE) established by the UN General Assembly.16 At the time, 
the group was composed of representatives of 15 UN member states,17 including the 
three ‘cyber superpowers’ China, Russia, and the US.18 On the one hand, the fact of 
anchoring the process at the UN has added to the legitimacy of its outputs in general.19 
Also, the 2013 report itself can arguably be taken as reflecting a shared understanding 
in the international community.20  
On the other hand, the report raised more questions than it answered. International 
law is supposed to apply, but which international law? Although the group endorsed 
the centrality of the UN Charter,21 several of its members have questioned the 
                                                          
12 See also H. H. Perritt, ‘The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s Role in 
Strengthening National and Global Governance’, (1998) 5 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 423, at 
429; K. Ziolkowski, Confidence Building Measures for Cyberspace: Legal Implications (2013), 165. 
13 T. Berners-Lee, ‘Information Management: A Proposal’, Internal Memo (CERN, March 1989), available 
at cds.cern.ch/record/1405411/files/ARCH-WWW-4-010.pdf.  
14 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/68/98, 24 June 2013 (‘GGE 
Report 2013’), at 8, para. 19. 
15 US, Department of State, ‘Statement on Consensus Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental 
Experts on Cyber Issues’, 7 June 2013, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm. 
16 GGE Report 2013, supra note 14. 
17 Ibid., at 12–13.  
18 See, e.g, A. Segal, The Hacked World Order (2016), 40. 
19 M. Finnemore and D. B. Hollis, ‘Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity’, (2016) 110 American 
Journal of International Law 425, at 448. 
20 The UN General Assembly subsequently ‘[w]elcom[ed]’ the GGE report in a unanimously adopted 
resolution without, however, discussing the details of its contents. See UN GA Res. 68/243, 9 January 
2014, preambular para. 11.  
21 GGE Report 2013, supra note 14, at 8, para. 19 (‘International law, and in particular the Charter of the 
United Nations, is applicable’) (emphasis added). 
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applicability of a prominent subdomain of international law – the law of armed conflict 
– to cyber operations.22 Perhaps more importantly, how is international law supposed 
to apply?23 It is one thing to know that the online realm is not a lawless world, but 
quite another to understand how existing rules apply to cyber phenomena.24 
Against this background, this article examines if the current situation is fairly 
described as one of crisis. To that end, it starts by weighing three key crisis indicators 
reverberating around states’ general reluctance to engage in law-making in the area of 
the international cyber security law (section 2). Since new binding rules are few and 
far between, it then looks to the pre-existing landscape of international law and the 
extent to which it provides a regulatory mechanism in its own right (section 3). 
Subsequently, the article shows that states’ retreat from their traditional legislative 
function has generated a power vacuum, triggering a number of non-state initiatives 
seeking to fill it (section 4). On the basis of historical precedents that include the 
development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety, the article then argues 
that states now have a critical window of opportunity to build on the plurality of 
emerging non-binding norms and thus reclaim their central law-making position 
(section 5). Whether they succeed in doing so will determine the future nature of 
cyberspace governance as well as the role played by international law in this regard. 
2. Crisis indicators: International law and cyber security 
Three indicators suggesting a crisis in this area of the law stand out. First, the domain 
of cyber security appears resistant to codification of the applicable rules in a 
comprehensive multilateral binding treaty.25 This is not for want of trying by the 
leading international stakeholders. Already in 1996, France put forward the earliest 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., US, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China (2011), 6 (‘China has not yet agreed with the U.S. position that existing mechanisms, 
such as International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, apply in cyberspace.’); E. 
Chernenko, ‘Russia Warns Against NATO Document Legitimising Cyberwars’, Kommersant-Vlast, 29 
May 2013, available at 
rbth.com/international/2013/05/29/russia_warns_against_nato_document_legitimising_cyberwars_264
83.html (reporting the Russian government’s scepticism towards the Tallinn Manual’s endorsement of 
the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace).  
23 For an examination of different approaches to the rule of law in cyberspace taken by, respectively, 
western countries and China, see Z. Huang and K. Mačák, ‘Towards the International Rule of Law in 
Cyberspace: Contrasting Chinese and Western Approaches’, (2017) 16 Chinese Journal of International Law 
(forthcoming).  
24 Accord A.-M. Osula and H. Rõigas, ‘Introduction’, in A.-M. Osula and H. Rõigas (eds.), International 
Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives (2016), 11 at 14. 
25 For existing sectoral and regional treaties concerning aspects of cyber security, see text at notes 69–78, 
infra. 
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proposal with the lofty title Charter for International Cooperation on the Internet.26 Later, 
a joint Russo-Chinese initiative resulted in two proposals for a Code of Conduct for 
Information Security, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, 
respectively.27 However, none of these proposals was met with much enthusiasm by 
other states28 and scholars describe the prospects of an ‘omnibus’ treaty being adopted 
in the near future as slim to negligible.29 In part, this is no doubt because, whatever the 
subject, the ‘very word “treaty” may conjure up the fearsome formalities of 
diplomacy’, with a chilling effect on states’ willingness to engage in this form of law-
making.30 Yet, with respect to cyber security, this aversion appears to be particularly 
pronounced.   
Second, states have shown extreme reluctance to contribute towards the 
development of cyber-specific customary international rules. In addition to state 
practice in this area being inevitably shrouded in secrecy,31 states have been reluctant 
                                                          
26 T. S. Wu, ‘Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System’, (1997) 10 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology 647, at 660. The initiative was reportedly supposed to ‘lead to an accord 
comparable to the international law of the sea, which governs the world’s oceans’. ‘France Seeks Global 
Internet Rules’, Reuters News Service, 31 January 1996, available at 
dasalte.ccc.de/crd/CRD19960205.html.de. 
27 Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/66/359, 
14 September 2011, at 3–5; Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 69/723, 13 January 2015, at 3–6. 
28 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Response to General Assembly resolution 68/243 ‘Developments in the 
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security’, May 2014, 
available at s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/UK.pdf, at 5 (noting that 
‘attempts to conclude comprehensive multilateral treaties, codes of conduct or similar instruments 
would [not] make a positive contribution to enhanced international cybersecurity’); M. Kaljurand, 
‘United Nations Group of Governmental Experts: The Estonian Perspective’, in Osula and Rõigas, supra 
note 24, 111 at 123 (stating that ‘starting negotiations on the draft Code of Conduct … would be 
premature’). 
29 See, e.g., J. Goldsmith, ‘Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View’, in P. Berkowitz (ed.), Future 
Challenges in National Security and Law (2011), available at 
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/futurechallenges_goldsmith.pdf, at 12; M. C. 
Waxman, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4)’, (2011) 36 Yale Journal 
of International Law 421, at 425–426; O. A. Hathaway et al., ‘The Law of Cyber-Attack’, (2012) 100 
California Law Review 817, at 882; K. E. Eichensehr, ‘The Cyber-Law of Nations’, (2015) 103 Georgetown 
Law Journal 317, at 356; M. N. Schmitt and L. Vihul, ‘The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms’, in 
Osula and Rõigas, supra note 24, 23 at 39. 
30 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), 26. 
31 See R. A. Clarke and R. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It 
(2010), xi (‘The entire phenomenon of cyber war is shrouded in such government secrecy that it makes 
the Cold War look like a time of openness and transparency.’). 
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to offer clear expressions of opinio juris on matters related to cyber security.32 At times, 
this approach may certainly be understandable, being the consequence of a domestic 
political gridlock or even a deliberate waiting strategy.33 On other occasions, it may 
rather be due to the persisting ‘cybersecurity knowledge gap’, in other words the 
striking lack of understanding of cybersecurity matters, which permeates the 
government structures in countries around the world.34 On the whole, this reluctance 
adds to the pervasive ambiguity as far as the specific applicability of international law 
is concerned.  
This trend is visible even in the most recent developments. A representative 
example of another missed opportunity to steer the development of cyber custom is 
provided by the recent US Law of War Manual adopted in July 2015 and updated in 
December 2016.35 Although it does contain a chapter on cyber operations,36 the Manual 
skirts virtually all of the unsettled issues, including standards of attribution, rules of 
targeting or the requirement to review cyber weapons.37  
While the first two indicators relate to states’ reluctance to act in ways meaningful 
for the generation of new rules, the third concerns their actual conduct in relation to 
cyber governance. It would be inaccurate to claim that states have entirely given up on 
standard-setting. However, instead of interpreting or developing rules of international 
law, state representatives have generally sought refuge in the more ambiguous term 
‘norms’. It is true that law and norms are ‘intimately intertwined’ concepts and that 
inter-state agreement on ‘norms’ may gradually influence the development of the 
law.38 Yet, a fundamental difference between the two is that a violation of a binding 
                                                          
32 Notable exceptions include, e.g., US, The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, 
Security, and Openness in a Networked World (2011); Koh, supra note 3; Brian J. Egan, ‘International Law 
and Stability in Cyberspace’, Speech at Berkeley Law School, 10 November 2016, available at 
www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stability-in-
Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf. 
33 M. N. Schmitt and S. Watts, ‘The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law 
of Cyber Warfare’, (2015) 50 Texas International Law Journal 189, at 211. 
34 See P. W. Singer and A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (2014), 4–
8. 
35 US, Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, Law of War Manual (2016), available at 
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-
%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf.  
36 Ibid., ch. xvi. 
37 See further S. Watts, ‘Cyber Law Development and the United States Law of War Manual’, in Osula 
and Rõigas, supra note 24, 49 at 60–63. 
38 Finnemore and Hollis, supra note 19, at 441–442. 
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rule of international law gives rise to international legal responsibility,39 while the 
same cannot be said of non-legal norms regulating cyber conduct.40 
The trend of promoting cyber norms is the most visible in the context of the work 
of the UN GGE. In its latest report, the group touted the advantages of ‘[v]oluntary, 
non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour’.41 The report claimed that such 
norms prevent conflict in cyberspace, foster international development, and reduce 
risks to international peace and security.42 The report further recommended 11 such 
norms for consideration by states,43 while making it clear that these norms operate on 
a decidedly non-legal plane.44 Despite their minimalistic nature, the norms have thus 
far received very limited endorsement by their addressees. For example, at a US-China 
summit in September 2015, the two participating heads of state ‘welcomed’ the report 
but refrained from committing themselves to any of the proposed norms.45 
Together, these three indicators signify a trend of moving away from the creation 
of legal rules of international law in the classical sense. Instead of developing binding 
treaty or customary rules, states resort to normative activity outside the scope of 
traditional international law. Although this trend appears to be especially prominent 
in the area of cyber security, it is by no means limited to it.46 In legal theory, this 
phenomenon has been described as ‘the pluralisation of international norm-making’,47 
characterised by the observation that ‘only a limited part of the exercise of public 
authority at the international level nowadays materialises itself in the creation of 
norms which can be considered international legal rules according to a classical 
understanding of international law’.48 In order to understand the impact this situation 
                                                          
39 International Law Commission (ILC), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, 2001 YILC, Vol. 53 II (Part Two), Art. 1; Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v. France), Special 
Arbitration Tribunal, (1990) 20 RIAA 215, at 251, para. 75 (‘any violation by a State of any obligation, of 
whatever origin, gives rise to State responsibility’). 
40 See further Schmitt and Vihul, supra note 29, at 25–27. 
41 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174, 22 July 2015 (‘GGE 
Report 2015’), at 7, para. 10 (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid., at 7, para. 10. 
43 Ibid., at 7–8, para. 13. 
44 Ibid., at 7, para. 10. 
45 US, White House, ‘Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States’, 25 September 
2015, available at obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-
jinpings-state-visit-united-states. 
46 For a general discussion of the process of gradual ‘surrender [of states’] monopoly on regulatory 
power’ from the perspective of global governance, see E. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (2014), 
25 et seq. 
47 J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (2011), 222. 
48 Ibid., at 2. 
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has on the international legal regulation of cyber security, we must zoom out slightly 
to take in the broader context of existing international law. 
3. Gaps and patches: Existing legal landscape 
3.1. Generally applicable rules 
The absence of a cyber-specific system of rules of international law does not mean that 
there are no legal rules that would apply to cyber activities. As we have seen, states 
accept that generally applicable rules of international law apply to states’ conduct in 
cyberspace, too. This is undoubtedly correct. If international law is to be an efficient 
governance structure, it must be adaptable to new phenomena without the need to 
reinvent an entire regulation framework on each occasion.49  
By way of an example, the UN Charter was finalised when the invention of nuclear 
weapons was still a closely guarded secret50 and this instrument thus understandably 
did not refer to this type of weapons in its provisions on the use of force.51 Still, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) had little difficulty in holding, in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion issued decades later, that those provisions ‘apply to any 
use of force, regardless of the weapons employed’,52 notwithstanding the fact that a 
particular type of weapons might not yet have been generally known or even invented 
when the Charter was adopted.53 Following the same logic, cyber operations must 
equally be subject to the international law regulation of the use of force.54 
The applicability of international human rights law (IHRL) to states’ conduct online 
is another highly relevant example. The foundations of this body of law were laid in 
                                                          
49 Cf. US, International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 32, at 9 (‘The development of norms for state 
conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render 
existing international norms obsolete.’). 
50 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Berchmans Soedarmanto Kadarisman, CR 
95/25, 3 November 1995, at para. 46 (‘the framers of the United Nations Charter could not be aware of 
the threat of nuclear weapons’). 
51 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 16 (1945), Arts. 2(4) and 39–51. 
52 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 
226, at para. 39. 
53 See further S. Kadelbach, ‘Interpretation of the Charter’, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (2012), 71 at 89 (arguing that the utility of the Charter travaux is limited 
given that many problems were not foreseen in 1945, whereas for others shared meanings have been 
worked out over time).  
54 Accord M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013) 
(hereinafter ‘Tallinn Manual’), 42; M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017) (hereinafter ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0’), 328. See section 4 infra for a 
detailed discussion of the two editions of the Manual and their contents. 
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the post-Second World War period when states adopted instruments which together 
form the so-called ‘International Bill of Human Rights’.55 Needless to say, these texts 
predate, by a large margin, the contemporary challenges inherent to and amplified by 
cyberspace. Still, this chronology does not render IHRL inapplicable to cyber activities. 
Quite the contrary: the fact that today ‘people are as likely to come together to pursue 
common interests online as in a church or a labor hall’ requires that universal human 
rights ‘also apply in cyberspace’, as then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued 
in a path-breaking speech in 2011.56 This position has since been endorsed by two 
resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council in 2012 and 2016, which have included 
identical phrases affirming that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be 
protected online’.57 
While the conclusion that these generally applicable rules of international law apply 
to conduct in cyberspace may offer some solace, many crucial questions remain 
unanswered. For instance, it is one thing to posit the applicability of the law on the use 
of force to cyberspace, but quite another to determine whether a specific cyber attack 
crosses the threshold of force in concrete circumstances. Although an influential set of 
factors known after their author as the ‘Schmitt criteria’ have emerged in the 
literature,58 little is known about states’ views in that regard.59 Crucially, no cyber 
operation—including Stuxnet, which has arguably been the most intrusive one thus 
                                                          
55 The International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the two Optional Protocols annexed 
thereto; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and its Protocol. 
56 US, DIPNOTE (US Department of State Official Blog), ‘Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and 
Challenges in a Networked World’, 15 February 2011, available at 
blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/02/15/internet-rights-and-wrongs-choices-and-challenges-networked-
world; see also Egan, supra note 32, at 15 (‘[a]ny regulation by a State of matters within its territory, 
including use of and access to the Internet, must comply with that State’s applicable obligations under 
international human rights law’). 
57 UN GA, Human Rights Council, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, 29 June 2012, at para. 1; UN GA, Human Rights Council, The 
Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20, 27 
June 2016, at para. 1. See also GGE Report 2013, supra note 14, at 8, para. 21; GGE Report 2015, supra 
note 41, at 8, para. 13(e) and at 12, para. 26; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 179. 
58 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework’, (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 914 (original list of six criteria: 
severity; immediacy; directness; invasiveness; measurability; and presumptive legitimacy); M. N. 
Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revised’, (2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 576 (revised 
list of seven criteria: severity; immediacy; directness; invasiveness; measurability; presumptive 
legitimacy; and responsibility); Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 334–336 (restated list of eight criteria: 
severity; immediacy; directness; invasiveness; measurability; military character; state involvement; and 
presumptive legality). 
59 For a notable exception, see Koh, supra note 3, at 3–4 (referencing the 1999 version of the ‘Schmitt 
criteria’). 
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far, having caused extensive physical damage to an Iranian nuclear facility in 201060—
has ever been described as amounting to a use of force by any state,61 whether by a 
victim or a bystander.62  
Similarly, the general agreement that human rights are also available online tells us 
very little about the legal qualification of new cyber phenomena that are without 
precedents from the offline era. A case in point is Tor, a technology that protects users 
against surveillance and traffic analysis online and thus enables them to communicate 
anonymously on the Internet.63 Western states including the US or Sweden apparently 
see Tor as a means for furthering privacy and freedom of expression and as such 
worthy of their moral and financial support.64 In contrast, China views this technology 
as a security threat and a tool of cyber attacks;65 in this light, it is unsurprising that the 
use of Tor is unlawful in China.66 Likewise, other non-western states including 
Ethiopia, Iran, and Kazakhstan have reportedly sought to block Tor traffic in the past.67 
In sum, it is unclear how to square states’ near-identical proclamations made at a high 
level of generality with their highly divergent behaviour with respect to particular 
phenomena unsubstantiated by any corresponding legal justification.68 
                                                          
60 See, e.g., Iran, Statement by H. E. Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 28 September 2012, available at iran-un.org/en/2012/09/28/28-september-2012-2/ 
(describing cyber attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities as ‘a manifestation of nuclear terrorism and 
consequently a grave violation of the principles of UN Charter and international law’ but stopping short 
of using the jus ad bellum language). 
61 But see Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 342 (noting that all members of the international group of 
experts considered the Stuxnet operation as a use of force). 
62 See, e.g., C. Henderson, ‘The Use of Cyber Force: Is the Jus ad Bellum Ready?’ Questions of International 
Law, 30 April 2016, available at www.qil-qdi.org/use-cyber-force-jus-ad-bellum-ready. 
63 See ‘Tor Project’, available at www.torproject.org. For a recent analysis of legal issues raised by the 
uses and abuses of Tor from the perspective of international and European law, see T. Minárik and A.-
M. Osula, ‘Tor Does Not Stink: Use and Abuse of the Tor Anonymity Network from the Perspective of 
Law’, (2016) 32(1) Computer Law and Security Review 111. 
64 See G. A. Fowler, ‘Tor: An Anonymous, And Controversial, Way to Web-Surf’, The Wall Street Journal, 
17 December 2012. 
65 Singer and Friedman, supra note 34, at 107. 
66 K. D. Watson, ‘The Tor Network: A Global Inquiry into the Legal Status of Anonymity Networks’, 
(2012) 11 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 715, at 727. 
67 UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/32, 22 May 2015, at para. 52. 
68 See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 188 (noting that the international group of experts ‘could 
achieve no consensus on the precise parameters of the right to freedom of expression’) and 194–195 
(‘although actions to prohibit, restrict, or undermine access to devices or technology that foster 
anonymity may, as a practical matter, reduce the exercise or enjoyment of international human rights 
online, such actions do not in themselves necessarily implicate international human rights law as a 
matter of lex lata on the basis of infringement with or loss of anonymity’). 
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3.2. Sectoral and regional treaties 
In addition to generally applicable rules of international law, certain sectoral and 
regional treaties taken together provide a ‘patchwork of regulations’ for cyber 
activities.69 These include, in particular, the 1992 Constitution of the International 
Telecommunication Union;70 the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime71 and its 
2006 Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism;72 the 2009 Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization’s Information Security Agreement;73 and the 2014 African Union’s Cyber 
Security Convention.74 Although important in their own right, these international 
agreements govern only a small slice of cyber-related activities (such as criminal 
offences committed by means of computer systems75 or operations interfering with 
existing telecommunications networks76), or have a very limited membership (six 
states in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s agreement77 and none 
yet in that of the African Union’s convention78). 
Therefore, although cyberspace is certainly not a lawless territory beyond the reach 
of international law, for now there is no complex regulatory mechanism governing 
state cyber activities.79 Moreover, states seem reluctant to engage themselves in the 
development and interpretation of international law applicable to cyber security. This 
                                                          
69 Hathaway, supra note 29, at 873. 
70 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, 1825 UNTS 143 (1992) (hereinafter ‘ITU 
Constitution’). 
71 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, ETS 185 (2001). 
72 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and 
Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems, ETS 189 (2003). 
73 Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (2009) (hereinafter 
‘Yekaterinburg Agreement’). 
74 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, AU Doc. EX.CL/846(XXV) 
(2014). 
75 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 71, Arts. 2–10. 
76 ITU Constitution, supra note 70, Art. 45 (prohibiting harmful interference) and Ann. (defining harmful 
interference). 
77 Yekaterinburg Agreement, supra note 73. In 2017, India and Pakistan are expected to join the Shanghai 
Co-operation Organization (SCO), which will likely result in a corresponding increase in the number of 
state parties to the Agreement. See AFP, ‘India, Pakistan Edge Closer to Joining SCO Security Bloc’, The 
Express Tribune, 24 June 2016, available at tribune.com.pk/story/1129533/india-pakistan-edge-closer-
joining-sco-security-bloc.  
78 See further H. Rõigas, ‘Mixed Feedback on the “African Union Convention on Cyber Security and 
Personal Data Protection”’, CCD COE INCYDER Database, 20 February 2015, available at 
ccdcoe.org/mixed-feedback-african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-
protection.html. 
79 See also Hathaway, supra note 29, at 873. 
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voluntary retreat has generated a power vacuum, enabling non-state actors to move 
into the space vacated by states80 and pursue various forms of ‘norm 
entrepreneurship’.81  
4. Power vacuum: Withdrawal of states and emergence of non-state initiatives 
4.1. Power and law 
Vectors of power and law do not overlap perfectly. State power is certainly influenced 
by many other factors, which may include military might, wealth, and moral 
authority.82 Nonetheless, it needs little emphasis that the relationship between power 
and law is a close one, particularly at the international level.83 In this sense, states may 
be said to normally opt for one of two archetypal approaches in order to actualize that 
relationship to further their interests. On the one hand, they frequently choose the path 
of legal certainty in order to consolidate and project their power. Indeed, if we 
understand power in the Nyean sense as ‘the ability to alter others’ behaviour to 
produce preferred outcomes’,84 then setting specific legal obligations is one way how 
to exercise this ability.85 Everything else being equal, it is more likely than not that 
these ‘others’ will act in accordance with a certain standard of behaviour when it is 
required by law than when it is not.86 
On the other hand, in certain contexts, the competing approach of legal uncertainty 
may be deemed desirable by even the most powerful states. In other words, states may 
choose to instrumentalize the ambiguity surrounding the existence, content, and 
interpretation of legal rules as a power-protecting tool. For example, during the early 
days of space exploration, only two states were capable of acting in outer space: the 
US and the Soviet Union. Yet these two states resisted, for a significant time, to commit 
                                                          
80 This has now been expressly acknowledged even by state representatives. See, e.g., Egan, supra note 
32, at 5. 
81 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkin, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, (1998) 52 
International Organisation 887, at 895–899; see also Finnemore and Hollis, supra note 19, at 446–448 
(examining the concept and function of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in the cybersecurity context). 
82 Byers, supra note 10, at 5. 
83 See further Higgins, supra note 2, at 3–4 (analysing the relationship between law and power from the 
perspective of international law). 
84 J. Nye, The Future of Power (2011), 10. 
85 See also Finnemore and Hollis, supra note 19, at 441–444 (arguing that, in addition to law, the bases 
on which particular conduct in cyberspace is labelled as appropriate or inappropriate include politics, 
culture, religion, and professional standards). 
86 See further J. Crawford, Change, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (2013), 40–49 
(demonstrating the effectiveness of international legal obligations on a diverse set of empirical examples 
including the protection of the ozone layer, restrictions on whaling, and slave trade). 
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themselves to any binding rules that would govern outer space. Both had believed that 
the adoption of such rules would only serve to constrain their activities in space. In 
that vein, ‘[l]egal uncertainty was useful to those with the power to act in space, on 
either side of the cold war.’87 
However, cyberspace and outer space – albeit frequently lumped together as so-
called ‘global commons’88 – are decidedly different from one another. This is not only 
because many states are challenging the very idea of cyberspace as commons by 
seeking to assert greater control online.89 More importantly, cyberspace is already a 
much more crowded domain than outer space could ever be. To wit, the US and the 
Soviet Union were not just the only states engaged in space exploration for several 
decades, they were also the only actors capable of space flight.90 In contrast, cyberspace 
is populated primarily by non-state actors, which include individuals, corporations, 
and other more loosely organised groups.91 The possibility of anonymity online 
combined with the corresponding difficulty of attribution of cyber operations have 
resulted in the ‘dramatic amplification’ of power in the hands of these non-state actors 
at the expense of their state counterparts.92  
The effect of legal uncertainty is thus much more complex than what we saw in the 
past in relation to outer space, as it affects a far more populous spectrum of actors, 
state and non-state alike. It is true that in terms of power and available resources, the 
relationship between states and non-state actors in cyberspace remains marked by ‘a 
clear disequilibrium in favor of States’.93 And yet, faced with states’ silence, non-state 
actors have moved into the vacated norm-creating territory, which had previously 
been occupied exclusively by states. These developments have been primarily driven 
                                                          
87 S. Banner, Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace from the Wright Brothers On (2008), 278. 
88 See, e.g., M. Barrett et al., Assured Access to the Global Commons (2011), at xii; S. Jasper and S. Moreland, 
‘Introduction: A Comprehensive Approach’, in S. Jasper (ed.), Conflict and Cooperation in the Global 
Commons (2012), 1 at 21; N. Tsagourias, ‘The Legal Status of Cyberspace’, in N. Tsagourias and R. Buchan 
(eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (2015), 13 at 24–25; P. Meyer, ‘Outer Space 
and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms’, in Osula and Rõigas, supra note 24, 155 at 157. 
89 S. Shackelford, Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations (2014), 58. 
90 Of course, the situation has dramatically changed since then. The number of space-faring states has 
been steadily increasing and even some non-state actors have demonstrated their capability to engage 
in outer space activities. See further P. Jankowitsch, ‘The Background and History of Space Law’, in F. 
von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2015), 1 at 1–28. 
91 See further J. Sigholm, ‘Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations’, (2013) 4 Journal of Military Studies 
1, at 9–23. 
92 C. Czosseck, ‘State Actors and their Proxies in Cyberspace’, in K. Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime 
for State Activities in Cyberspace (2013), 1 at 1–3. 
93 K. Bannelier and T. Christakis, Cyber-Attacks – Prevention-Reactions: The Role of States and Private Actors 
(2017), 9. 
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by the private sector and by the academia, as epitomised by Microsoft’s cyber norms 
proposal and by the so-called Tallinn Manual project.  
4.2. Leading non-state-driven initiatives 
Firstly, Microsoft’s proposal entitled International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing 
Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World was published in December 2014.94 Interestingly, 
this white paper was not the first private-sector initiative of this kind. Exactly 15 years 
earlier, Steve Case, then the CEO of AOL, urged states to revise their ‘country-centric’ 
laws and adopt instead ‘international standards’ governing crucial aspects of conduct 
online, including security, privacy, and taxation.95 Still, Microsoft’s text was the first 
comprehensive proposal of specific standards of behaviour online, which, despite its 
private origin, proposed norms purporting to regulate solely the conduct of states.96 
The openly proclaimed central aim of this white paper was to reduce the possibility 
that information and communications technology (ICT) products and services would 
be ‘used, abused or exploited by nation states as part of military operations’.97 To that 
end, the paper put forward six cyber security norms, which collectively called on states 
to improve their cyber defences and limit their engagement in offensive operations.98  
Microsoft’s original proposal was met with criticism to the effect that by focussing 
on states, the paper ignored the crucial role that the industry must itself take on to 
achieve global cyber security.99 In 2016, Microsoft responded to these claims by issuing 
another white paper entitled From Articulation to Implementation: Enabling Progress on 
Cybersecurity Norms.100 In it, the company proposed six further cybersecurity norms, 
                                                          
94 A. McKay et al., International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World 
(2014), available at aka.ms/cybernorms. 
95 S. Case, ‘Remarks Prepared for Delivery (via satellite) Israel ’99 Business Conference’, 13 December 
1999, cited in J. Goldsmith and T. S. Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (2006), 
194 (urging nations to ‘revis[e] outdated and “country-centric” laws on telecommunications and taxes 
that could thwart the growth of the medium’ and instead embrace ‘international standards—from 
security, to privacy, to taxation.’). 
96 McKay et al., supra note 94, at 2–3. 
97 S. Choney, ‘6 Proposed Cybersecurity Norms Could Reduce Conflict’, Microsoft: The Fire Hose, 5 
December 2014, available at blogs.microsoft.com/firehose/2014/12/05/6-proposed-cybersecurity-norms-
could-reduce-conflict. 
98 McKay et al., supra note 94, at 2. The complete list of the proposed norms may be found in the annex 
to the document: ibid., at 20. 
99 S. Charney et al., From Articulation to Implementation: Enabling Progress on Cybersecurity Norms (2016), 
available at mscorpmedia.azureedge.net/mscorpmedia/2016/06/Microsoft-Cybersecurity-
Norms_vFinal.pdf, at 3. 
100 Ibid. 
30 Leiden Journal of International Law (2017) (forthcoming) 
16 
this time addressed to ‘the global ICT industry’.101 These were meant to complement 
and strengthen the norms published in the earlier document.102  
On the whole, however, the text made no secret of the fact that it, like the entire 
Microsoft-led cyber norms project, was still primarily addressed to states. Even parts 
that concerned the role of the industry were written in the form of demands that the 
recognition of that role would place on states. For instance, the paper appealed to states 
to involve the industry in the norms debate, to draw on its technical expertise, and to 
give greater weight to its input overall.103 In early 2017, Microsoft further stepped up 
its initiative, calling on states to transform its six state-oriented norms into an 
international treaty with a bold working title: ‘a Digital Geneva Convention’.104 
Secondly, the Tallinn Manual process was a seven-year project undertaken under 
the auspices of the Estonia-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCD COE).105 The project brought together an international group of 
experts under the leadership of Professor Michael Schmitt and resulted in the 
publication of two editions of the Manual respectively in 2013106 and 2017.107 Although 
both editions acknowledged the support of the NATO CCD COE, they also made it 
clear that their text reflected only the personal views of the experts and not the states 
or institutions from which they originated.108 
The first edition, entitled Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, maintained an almost exclusive focus on activities occurring above the level 
of the use of force. Its text identified 95 purported rules of customary international law, 
the vast majority of which related to the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum)109 and 
the law of armed conflict (jus in bello).110 The Manual quickly became a standard 
reference point and was deservedly praised for breaking new ground as well as for 
providing useful practical guidance.111 However, early reviews and reactions from 
                                                          
101 Ibid., at 7. 
102 Ibid., at 6. 
103 Ibid., at 2. 
104 B. Smith, President of Microsoft Corporation, Transcript of Keynote Address at the RSA Conference 
2017, 14 February 2017, available at mscorpmedia.azureedge.net/mscorpmedia/2017/03/Transcript-of-
Brad-Smiths-Keynote-Address-at-the-RSA-Conference-2017.pdf. 
105 See ‘Tallinn Manual Process’, available at ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html.  
106 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54. 
107 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54. 
108 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 11; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 2. 
109 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, rules 10–19. 
110 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, rules 20–95. 
111 See, e.g., K. Eichensehr, ‘Review of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013)’, (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 585, at 585–589. 
From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers 
17 
states not involved in the project criticized the project’s preoccupation with military 
uses of cyberspace and noted that in reality, most (if not all) cyber operations fall below 
the threshold of the use of force.112 
The 2017 edition, published under the slightly modified title Tallinn Manual 2.0 on 
the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, addressed these criticisms by 
considerably expanding the scope of the study.113 The second edition thus nearly 
doubled the number of rules identified, for a total of 154 agreed rules of custom, only 
about a half of which related to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.114 In addition, the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 covers multiple areas of ‘peacetime international law’,115 including 
state responsibility,116 the law of the sea,117 air and space law,118 and even human rights 
law.119 This substantive revision and expansion of the text will likely further strengthen 
the project’s overall relevance as well as its claim to authority. Yet, like the Microsoft 
paper, both iterations of the Tallinn Manual project put forward standards of state 
behaviour and are avowedly state-centric in their approach. 
4.3. Differences and similarities 
Understandably, the two initiatives differ in important ways. The ‘norms’ proposed 
by Microsoft are clearly meant as broad suggestions only, meaning that states need to 
transform them into more specific commitments. For instance, norm 2 stipulates that 
‘states should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and service 
vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors rather than to 
stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them’.120 As recognised in the 2014 paper, such policies 
need to be developed by each individual state and tailored to the needs of that state.121 
The 2016 paper complements this general proposal by endorsing the existing best 
                                                          
112 See, e.g., D. Fleck, ‘Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare: A Critical First 
Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual’, (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 331, at 332–335; 
Eichensehr, supra note 111, at 589; see also Ma Xinmin, ‘Key Issues and Future Development of 
International Cyberspace Law’, (2016) 2 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 119, at 128 
(noting the Chinese view that the risk of the law-of-war focus on the regulation of cyberspace was that 
it would aggravate the arms race and militarisation in cyberspace). 
113 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 1–6. 
114 See ibid., rules 68–154. 
115 Ibid., at 2 
116 Ibid., at 79–167. 
117 Ibid., at 232–258. 
118 Ibid., at 259–283. 
119 Ibid., at 179–208. 
120 McKay et al., supra note 94, at 12; Charney et al., supra note 99, at 7. 
121 McKay et al., supra note 94, at 12. 
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practice standards of co-ordinated vulnerability disclosure by the ICT industry.122 
However, neither of the two texts puts forward any more detailed prescriptions for 
states.123  
By contrast, the Tallinn Manual ‘rules’ take on the more restrictive and specific form 
of purported customary legal obligations, which should simply be observed by states 
as binding without the need for their further endorsement or adaptation.124 In other 
words, both editions of the Manual have aimed to interpret how ‘extant legal norms’ 
apply to conduct in cyberspace,125 and not to ‘set forth lex ferenda’.126 Nonetheless, the 
detailed and frequently novel positions put forward by the Manuals blur the fuzzy line 
between norm interpretation and norm development.127 For example, Rule 99 (ex Rule 
37) sets out the prohibition of cyber attacks against civilian objects in the context of an 
armed conflict.128 Both crucial terms – ‘cyber attacks’ as well as ‘civilian objects’ – are 
precisely defined by the Manual.129 Although some disagreements may persist about 
the application of the rule in specific circumstances,130 the content of the norm is 
sufficiently clear and precise to generate legal rights and obligations. 
Yet, what initiatives like Microsoft’s white papers or the Tallinn Manual project 
share is their non-state origin and expressly non-binding nature. Microsoft was keenly 
aware of its proposal’s limitations in this respect and noted that it merely ‘encouraged’ 
states to set the proposed norms on the trajectory towards making them first 
‘politically’ and then ‘legally’ binding.131 Similarly, the first edition of the Manual stated 
                                                          
122 Charney et al., supra note 99, at 8. 
123 See also Smith, supra note 104, at 10 (calling on states to adopt a ‘global convention’ that would 
include norms from Microsoft’s 2014 and 2016 proposals). 
124 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 4; see also Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 6. 
125 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 1; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 1. 
126 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 5; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 3. 
127 See further K. Mačák, ‘Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects 
under International Humanitarian Law’, (2015) 48 Israel Law Review 55, at 59–63 (discussing the 
distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda in the first edition of the Manual). 
128 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 434; see also Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 124. 
129 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 54, at 415 (definition of cyber attack) and at 435, para. 4 (definition of 
civilian objects); see also Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 91 (definition of cyber attack) and at 125, para. 
3 (definition of civilian objects). 
130 See, e.g., the debate whether computer data may constitute an ‘object’ for the purposes of 
international humanitarian law (IHL): H. A. Harrison Dinniss, ‘The Nature of Objects: Targeting 
Networks and the Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives’, (2015) 48 Israel Law Review 39; 
Mačák, supra note 127; M. N. Schmitt, ‘The Notion of ‘Objects’ during Cyber Operations: A Riposte in 
Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision’, (2015) 48 Israel Law Review 81. 
131 McKay et al., supra note 94, at 3; see also Smith, supra note 104, at 10 (‘And we then need to build on 
that with a global convention.’). 
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in its introduction that it was meant to be ‘a non-binding document’.132 As all of these 
texts are in their entirety the products of non-state initiatives, they could hardly 
amount to anything else. After all, with potential minor qualifications in the area of 
collective security, it is still true that only ‘the states are the legislators of the 
international legal system’.133 
If these texts are non-binding, one might question their relevance from the 
perspective of international law altogether. Admittedly, their normativity (in the sense 
of the strength of their claim to authority134) is lower than that of international legal 
rules. Similarly, the ongoing International Law Commission (ILC) study on the 
Identification of Customary International Law notes in this regard in its draft conclusion 
4(3) that conduct of actors other than states and international organizations ‘is not 
practice that contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary 
international law’.135  
But that does not mean that these efforts are wholly irrelevant for the formation of 
rules of international law, and even less do they document any supposed irrelevance 
of international law to the area of cyber security. On the contrary, non-state-driven 
initiatives of this kind potentially amount to ‘a vital intermediate stage towards a more 
rigorously binding system, permitting experiment and rapid modification’.136 
Moreover, they render the law-making process more multilateral and inclusive than 
the traditional state-driven norm-making can ever be.137 As the ILC recognizes in the 
remainder of the cited draft conclusion, conduct of non-state actors may be relevant 
                                                          
132 Tallinn Manual, supra note 54, at 1. The sentence in question does not appear in the second edition of 
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when assessing the practice of states.138 Therefore, the crucial question is whether states 
decide to pick up the gauntlet thrown at them by their non-state counterparts. 
5. Offline analogies: States at a critical juncture 
5.1. Soft law and hard law 
The current situation is certainly not without prior historical parallels. Cyberspace is 
not the first novel phenomenon to have resisted the development of global governance 
structures for some time after its emergence. A degree of waiting or stalling may even 
reflect states’ desire to obtain a better understanding of the new phenomenon’s 
strategic potential.139 Yet with states’ improved comprehension of the new situation, 
their willingness to subject themselves to binding rules usually increases, too. Even the 
domain of outer space was eventually subjected to a binding legal regime,140 despite 
the strong initial reluctance of the dominant spacefaring states.141  
Other domains with a higher number of participants may provide more appropriate 
analogies. A good example is the legal regime of the Antarctic region. Although its 
central instrument, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,142 is a binding international agreement, 
it did not establish a comprehensive legal regime regulating all aspects of the Antarctic 
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environment.143 Instead, it allowed for and, to some extent, encouraged the adoption 
of ‘recommended measures’ and other types of non-binding norms for specific areas 
of international concern.144 Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, state representatives put 
forward many ‘soft norms’ of this kind, which shared the objective of preservation and 
conservation of living and non-living resources in Antarctica.145 Subsequently, some of 
these measures were implemented by many (though not all) parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty in their domestic law, paving the way towards the consolidation of the norms 
in question into international ‘hard law’.146 This finally materialized with the adoption 
of the 1991 Antarctic Environmental Protection Protocol, a complex binding 
instrument that has since been ratified by all key stakeholders.147  
Another useful parallel is the regulation of nuclear safety in international law. 
Although the first nuclear power plant in the world was launched already in 1954 in 
Obninsk, Soviet Union,148 it took over three decades until the first international 
conventions on nuclear safety were adopted.149 In the meantime, states were guided 
by non-binding safety standards and criteria, most of which were issued by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).150 Afterwards, nuclear safety 
conventions adopted in the 1980s and 1990s151 consolidated this emerging body of non-
binding norms and made many of the relevant standards mandatory for all member 
states.152 Once again, states proceeded cautiously, slowly transforming into binding 
law those norms that were perceived as workable and acceptable by all stakeholders. 
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Of course, there are important differences between these areas of international law 
and the cyber security domain. Perhaps most visibly, unlike the cyber norms initiatives 
analysed previously, the law-making processes relating to the environmental 
protection in Antarctica or the global nuclear safety had been predominantly state-
driven. However, that should not detract from their value as examples demonstrating 
the time-tested trajectory of transformation of soft law norms into hard law rules.153  
After all, there is no doubt that non-state actors have, on many occasions, 
contributed to the adoption of binding multilateral international treaties. For instance, 
it is well known that the lawyer Raphael Lemkin played a central role154 in 
campaigning for and later drafting the 1948 Genocide Convention.155 Similarly, the 
1984 Convention against Torture156 was adopted after years of international pressure 
led by Amnesty International.157 A yet more recent example is the 2008 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions,158 the agreement on which was catalysed by the personal presence 
of survivors of cluster munition attacks at the formal negotiations.159 To partially 
paraphrase Margaret Mead’s famous quote,160 non-state actors might not be the only 
thing that ever has changed international law, but they are certainly capable of doing 
so.161 
Therefore, instead of lamenting over a supposed crisis of international law, it is 
more appropriate to view the current situation as an intermediate stage on the way 
towards the generation of cyber ‘hard law’. Non-state-driven initiatives provide 
opportunities for states to identify overlaps with their strategic interests. In other 
words, these initiatives may serve as norm-making laboratories, allowing states to 
weigh the pros and cons of various proposals in their context and to decide on this 
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basis which ones to endorse and which ones to reject. Their usefulness in this sense is 
confirmed by a 2015 report of the EastWest Institute, which helpfully maps out areas 
of convergence across various proposals of norms of state behaviour in cyberspace 
including those analysed in this article.162 As noted in the report, most norm-making 
initiatives agree on the general principles ensuring the stability and security of 
cyberspace as well as on the need for state co-operation in mitigating malicious cyber 
incidents.163 
5.2. Timeliness and attribution 
Even if this article’s contention regarding the feasibility of the soft-to-hard-law 
pathway in cyberspace is accepted, one might still question whether it already is the 
right time for states to start taking specific legislative action. It is submitted that the 
key to this question of timeliness can be found by unpacking the so-called attribution 
problem, which relates to the difficulty in determining the identity or location of a 
cyber attacker or their intermediary.164 In fact, for some time, the attribution problem 
was rightly seen as an impediment to the development of effective legal regulation of 
cyber activities. It was argued that the prevailing anonymity online ‘makes it difficult 
– if not impossible – for rules on either cybercrime or cyberwar to regulate or deter.’165 
Indeed, without the victim states being at least theoretically capable of identifying the 
source of malicious cyber operations against them, any attempts to design rules aimed 
at constraining the perpetrators of such attacks would have very limited prospects of 
success.  
However, recent technological progress has translated into increased confidence of 
states with respect to attribution of cyber activities. For instance, since 2012, the US has 
maintained that it possesses the capacity to locate its cyber adversaries and hold them 
accountable.166 It has subsequently put this position in practice by unequivocally 
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attributing several high-profile cyber attacks to other states, including the 2014 ‘Sony 
hack’ to North Korea167 and the 2016 ‘DNC hack’ to Russia.168 In a recent publication, a 
US Department of Justice official made the link between cyber attribution and norm-
making explicit: ‘[W]e will be able to use our ability to attribute malicious cyber 
activity to push other countries toward accepting and abiding by cyber norms.’169  
Other countries have soon followed suit. In 2014, Canada noted that it had robust 
systems in place allowing it to localize cyber intrusions, including those orchestrated 
by state-sponsored actors.170 In 2015, the United Kingdom stated it was ‘increasingly 
confident in our ability to determine from where attacks come’.171 In 2016, Germany’s 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported that it had been able to 
attribute ‘electronic attacks’ against targets in Germany to attackers operating from 
China and Russia as well as to Iranian governmental agencies.172  
It remains debated to what extent these public statements should be taken at face 
value.173 When signalling confidence with respect to their attribution capabilities, 
states may admittedly be motivated also by other factors, including their legitimate 
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aim to deter future attacks in general.174 After all, to put the point at its lowest, 
deception is certainly not a behavioural pattern foreign to the cyber domain.175 
Nevertheless, as a matter of general trend, maintaining anonymity online is becoming 
more difficult and actors in cyberspace may consequently be expected to give 
increased consideration to the regulation of cyber conduct. 
In addition to these technical considerations, significant progress has also been 
made in the understanding of the legal standards of attribution as applied to online 
conduct.176 Although the existing law of state responsibility is certainly not without 
persisting uncertainties in relation to attribution of cyber operations to states, it can no 
longer be plausibly claimed that this area of law is unsuitable for conduct in 
cyberspace. On the basis of the foregoing, it can therefore be summarized that while it 
is probably correct that the attribution problem can at most be managed but not 
solved,177 these developments show that time may be ripe for states to endorse the 
regulatory and deterrent potential of international legal rules.  
5.3. Way forward 
Building on the emerging normative convergence identified above, states have today 
a unique opportunity to reclaim their central role in international law-making as far as 
the law of cyber security is concerned. Due to the complex nature of the field and the 
plurality of actors that populate it at present, this will likely not be a quick or a simple 
process. In this regard, states’ prospects of success will depend on their willingness to 
act in specific legislative ways that can be organized in a chronological order as short-
, medium-, and long-term strategies. 
In the more immediate future, states should become more forthcoming in 
expressing their opinion as to the interpretation of existing international law to cyber 
issues.178 This will in time enable the applicable opinio juris to consolidate, thus 
                                                          
174 J. R. Lindsay, ‘Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and the Feasibility of Deterrence Against 
Cyberattack’, (2015) 1 Journal of Cybersecurity 53, at 63. 
175 See, e.g., N. C. Rowe and E. J. Custy, ‘Deception in Cyber-Attacks’, in L. J. Janczewski and A. M. 
Colarik (eds.), Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (2008), 91 at 91–96 (survey on deception in cyber 
attacks). 
176 See, e.g., N. Tsagourias, ‘Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution’, (2012) 17 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 229; Z. Huang, ‘The Attribution Rules in ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: A Preliminary Assessment on Their Application to Cyber Operations’, (2015) 14 Baltic 
Yearbook of International Law 41; K. Mačák, ‘Decoding Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility: Attribution of Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors’, (2016) 21 Journal 
of Conflict & Security Law 405. 
177 T. Rid and B. Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, (2014) 38 Journal of Strategic Studies 1, at 28. 
178 For other similar calls on states to be more proactive in expressing their cyber-specific opinio juris, see, 
e.g., K. Ziolkowski, ‘General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace’, in 
30 Leiden Journal of International Law (2017) (forthcoming) 
26 
facilitating the process of transformation of state power into obligations of customary 
law.179 In order to increase their ability to meaningfully engage in this process, all states 
should make the development of cyber security expertise into one of their domestic 
priorities; complete or update their national cyber security strategies;180 and streamline 
their decision-making leading into the adoption of positions on ambiguous legal 
matters concerning cyber security.  
Crucially, these steps may include the need to engage with those non-state actors 
that are currently driving the ongoing norm-making efforts.181 States participating in 
the UN GGE process acknowledged as much already in their 2013 report.182 Similarly, 
Microsoft included a call on states to take industry input into account in its most recent 
white paper.183 Finally, in early 2016, over 50 states submitted their observations on the 
draft second edition of the Tallinn Manual to the international group of experts as part 
of the so-called Hague Process, a joint co-operative effort of the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and NATO CCD COE.184 This demonstrates states’ growing awareness 
of the importance of contributing to the international norm-making process.185 
However, the Hague Process consultations were held behind closed doors and the 
views submitted by the participating states have not and will not be made public.186 
As such, they cannot be seen as contributing to the formation of customary 
international law per se.187 Still, the fact that so many states felt ready and able to take 
part in the consultations suggests that to the extent states remain silent on their opinio 
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juris, this decision needs to be explained by factors other than the purported absence 
of considered legal views on their part.188 
Although it is important for states to become more open in expressing their cyber 
opinio juris, that is but the necessary first step if they are to succeed in reclaiming a 
central role in international law-making. In the medium term, states should also aim 
to gradually overcome their current aversion to treaty commitments. There are some 
early signs that this process may already be underway. For example, in September 
2015, the US and China concluded a ‘surprising’189 agreement to refrain from certain 
types of cyber espionage.190 A series of further non-binding bilateral agreements 
between the key players entered into in the recent period may also gradually pave the 
way towards legally binding cyber treaties.191 
Finally, this iterative process of state-appropriated norm-making could in the long 
run quite plausibly result in the adoption of one or several comprehensive multilateral 
undertakings. These would likely commence with definitional matters to enable future 
consensus-building over more substantive issues.192 There are a number of terms with 
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contested or unclear meaning, including such central notions as critical 
infrastructure,193 cyber attack, cyber warfare or cybercrime.194  
Once states agree on a shared definition of these concepts, the next step may be to 
turn to identification of the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of possible agreement on matters of 
substance. Their precise scope falls to be determined by further research. However, 
studies looking at overlaps between various norms proposals may provide some initial 
pointers.195 Equally, states may be willing to act—including by legislating on the 
international plane—against threats that affect them all. A good example in this regard 
may be botnets, in other words, networks of private computers infected by malware 
and controlled as a group without their owners’ knowledge.196 These have rightly been 
described as ‘a scourge to all’ and a multilateral consensus to outlaw the building of 
such systems may indeed be within the realm of the possible.197 
6. Conclusion 
International cyber security law is at a critical juncture today. It is true that states’ 
hesitation to engage in the development and application of international law has 
generated a power vacuum allowing for the emergence of non-state norm-making 
initiatives. Still, it would be premature to speak of a situation of crisis.  
Several historical parallels show that a mixture of initial soft-law approaches 
combined with a growing set of binding rules can provide a logical and functioning 
response to a novel phenomenon. In the twenty-first century, pluralisation of norm-
making processes involving diverse state and non-state actors is a common feature at 
the international level and it need not be feared as such.198 Moreover, states have 
recently started to awake to the need to publicly express their views on how 
international law applies in cyberspace.199 
To return to the quotes cited at the start of this article, initiatives by small groups of 
thoughtful committed people from academia, industry or elsewhere should be 
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welcomed because of their potential to change the world by steering the development 
of the law accordingly.200 What matters is whether states will decide to respond in a 
way that will reaffirm their position at the heart of the international legal system also 
when it comes to cyber security.201 It appears that at least some state representatives 
already realize that compliance with international law in fact frees them to do more, 
and do more legitimately, in cyberspace.202  
Hence, it remains to be seen whether this awareness will spread and gradually 
translate into states’ general willingness to also shape the content of the law by 
reclaiming their traditional central legislative role in this area. In this way, states’ 
conduct in the next few years will determine whether we will observe a gradual 
demise of inter-state governance of cyberspace or a fundamental recalibration of legal 
approaches with states taking centre stage once again. If they want to ensure that the 
existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that might upset their ability to 
achieve their strategic and political goals, states should certainly not hesitate too long. 
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